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| AsiaViews, Edition: 43/V/Nov/2008 |
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| South Korea’s Middle Power: Diplomacy and Regional Security Cooperation |
| As a ‘middle power, South Korea, can take the initiative and play a key role in the field of regional cooperation. South Korea has the ability to push East Asian regionalism forward in a way that Japan, China and the United States, as the region’s major powers, are unable to. The limited capabilities of Japan and China in this regard are a result of historical antagonisms and fears of a future hegemony. South Korea, which has no history or future prospects of regional hegemony, can thus be a major actor, especially in cooperation with the United States, in future moves towards regional integration. Dr. Young Jong Choi, a professor International Relations at the Catholic University of Korea, was the keynote speaker at the Asian Voices series on October 2, hosted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA in Washington, DC. The following is an excerpt of the paper presented by Dr. Young. |
The South Korean government of President Lee Myung Bak is now immersed in cleaning up the messes inflicted upon the nation by the previous two leftist governments: big government and pro-North Korea policies. While defining that period as the “lost ten years”, the Lee government is attempting to turn the clock back by implementing neoliberal reforms and restoring the strained ROK-US alliance. However, there is a strong political backlash against these efforts. Domestic reform is not easy not only because of Lee Myung Bak’s incompetence and strategic errors, but also because of the power and creativity of leftist organizations strengthened under the previous two governments.
On the foreign policy front, “turning back the clock” is neither feasible anymore due to a highly mobilized, globally renowned domestic opposition, nor plausible since the status quo ante no longer exists. The most imaginative accomplishment carried out by this opposition was the creation of the “myth of mad cow disease” from US beef, which drove tens of thousands of South Koreans into the streets for several months. I think it was largely an outpouring of anti-Americanism disguised in the name of public health and safety.
In addition, the world surrounding South Korea right now is not what it used to be ten years ago, when South Korea began its estrangement into a “wonderland”, where the obsession with Pyongyang turned South Korea blind toward the outside world. It is much more fluid and complicated without a clear dividing line between friends and enemies. The US-China relationship is oscillating from potential enemy to strategic partner. The US-North Korean relationship is also not fixed in a state of permanent antagonism. The Japan-China relationship is also moving beyond the stage of perennial suspicion. Russia is back onto the main stage of regional power politics. China is rapidly rising, and Japan is normalizing itself into a major military power. North Korea’s survival tactics are ever evolving.
Even a properly working US-ROK security alliance, as good as ten years ago, may fall short of handling these new challenges for South Korea. However, the US and South Korea still have to work out a concrete design for their future alliance. Moreover, North Korea is too unruly and shrewd for South Korea to discipline even with the current “engagement with reciprocity” approach by the Lee government.
President Lee Myung-bak’s backward turn in foreign policy, restoring close ties with the US and Japan, has only caused North Korea’s anger and China’s concern. Seoul lost a lot of social capital in its relationship with the United States during the “beef incident”. And the territorial dispute with Japan is ever aggravating. The US-Japan-South Korea triangular cooperation that has brought both security and prosperity to South Korea during most of the post-WWII period does not seem to be a viable option any longer for South Korea given the absence of common enemies, the lack of trust between Japan and South Korea, and insufficient domestic support.
South Korea’s Security Concern
North Korea’s nuclear threat is now taken as a serious problem inside the Blue House. Even though it is quite a change from the Roh era, this threat perception is still not widely shared among South Korean people. North Korea is still considered more as a brother in need than a threat to be stopped. Moreover, the US has shown a strong commitment to denuclearizing North Korea, and other neighboring major powers have shared interests in stopping North Korea’s nuclear program. With this insurance in place, costs loomed larger to South Koreans than actual risks. Therefore, their major concern was to secure a seat at the negotiating table and avoid taking undue financial burdens. This attitude was also reflected in the pro-North Korean stance by the Roh government in dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear program. From the perspective of South Korea, “the six-party talks” has worked relatively well in containing North Korea’s nuclear threats even if it failed to denuclearize North Korea.
South Koreans feel increasingly more threatened by China and Japan. China, South Korea’s number one trading partner, is a land of opportunity for Korean businesses. China also holds a key to North Korea’s nuclear problem. At one point former President Roh Moo-hyun appeared to have expected that China would elevate South Korea to the position of a balancer in Northeast Asia. Then came China’s attempt to incorporate a part of ancient Korea’s history into its own. South Koreans came to realize that China was no different from other ascending powers, mindful of wielding their newly gained power for their own national interests. The South Korean government had to deal with China as such. Besides alignment with the United States, South Korea is exploring the possibility of a strategic partnership with China. Even though its concrete shape is up in the air, it is a substantial departure from South Korea’s traditional diplomacy.
Similarly, South Korea can no longer take Japan for granted. South Koreans have considered Japan to be under a permanent obligation to help or support them whenever necessary, as penance for its colonial past. Japan has not betrayed this expectation partly due to guilty-feelings and partly out of self-interests. Japan is now accelerating its move to become a normal state by shedding its memory of an inglorious past, beefing up its military strengths, and pursuing active and assertive diplomacy. Japan is not as hesitant in confronting South Korea as in the past, be it the history textbook issue or territorial disputes. Instead of being a passive state constantly in fear of a rising China and an uncontrollable Russia, Japan is actively engaging China and Russia. South Korea’s strategic value will decrease substantially if China is no longer something to be contained. In that case, a normal Japan may easily bypass South Korea in regional politics. Then, Japan would turn into an independent variable and South Korea has to deal with it as such.
Unlike during the cold war period, the security environment surrounding South Korea is very fluid, dynamic, and uncertain. Nothing is a given for South Korea, including the ROK-US bilateral security alliance; and even a properly working US-ROK alliance will not do to relieve South Korea’s security concerns. Deepening bilateral relations with China, Japan, and North Korea will offer only a partial solution, given South Korea’s limited leverage over them. South Koreans are feeling increasingly frustrated over their complete inability to influence North Korea, China, the United States and even Japan. If the nationalism and anti-Americanism that brought Roh to presidency five years ago arose largely from elated self-confidence and national pride, the recent rise of nationalist feelings in South Korea more reflects anxiety, fear, and frustration.
Under the circumstances, South Korea has good reasons to go “regional”. A regional security structure can add stability and certainty to South Korea’s security environment. Depending on the strength of institutional norms and rules, South Korea can also lessen power asymmetry vis-a-vis China, Japan, and even North Korea. A regional security structure will provide breathing space to South Korea, which is unavailable in a tight bilateral alliance with the United States. It will also have the effect of boosting South Korea’s self-esteem, as well as the legitimacy of political leaders.
Besides an institutional lock-in effect with China and Japan, a regional structure will be useful to manage North Korea. North Korea’s nuclear issue is currently deadlocked in spite of China’s high leverage against North Korea, as well as the “carrot and stick” approach applied by the hegemonic US. The nuclear issue may be embedded in a broader regional security framework to come up with a sustainable solution. A more serious problem for South Korea is a post-nuclear era North Korea. To reform North Korea in a sustainable and non-threatening way while minimizing costs to South Korea will be a daunting task, and a multilateral approach will be better for burden sharing. Again, territorial issues in the region can in no way be resolved bilaterally: they require sustained effort by regional organizations.
South Korea’s Middle Power Activism
Regional security cooperation is in South Korea’s interest. Moreover, South Korea is in a good position to take the initiative for regional institutional cooperation. The US and North Korea are very well known for their sensitivity to state sovereignty. Accordingly, the US has quite often opted for unilateralism over multilateralism, and North Korea has even refused to join the international society. China is slightly behind but still very sensitive to its sovereignty. Even though Japan is far less sensitive, Japan’s leadership is still a cause of concern for countries like China and South Korea. South Korea, a medium-level power with great enthusiasm for an active foreign policy, is best suited to take the initiative. As a junior partner to the US, South Korea is used to compromising national sovereignty for security purposes.
South Korea is well known for its enthusiasm for regional institution-building. Starting from the ASPAC (Asia Pacific Council) initiated by Park Chung-hee in 1966, South Korean presidents have continuously shown great interests in regional economic and security cooperation. In recent years, Kim Dae-jung gave a clearer shape to the future East Asian Community by initiating the East Asian Vision Group and the East Asian Study Group in 1998. Roh Moo-hyun ambitiously pushed the Northeast Asian cooperation initiative. Building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, as well as a multilateral security cooperation regime in Northeast Asia, were his top foreign policy priorities.
This kind of active regional policy is not strange to a middle power like South Korea. The concept of a middle power as a distinctive category of actor in international relations is not unproblematic, particularly concerning its definition. Some define it with attributes like GDP, population, and size; and others define it with behavior, particularly with active internationalist diplomacy. In recent years, constructivists treat it as a self-created identity or ideology. South Korea may lag behind traditional middle powers like Canada, Australia and most Nordic countries in terms of diplomatic capabilities and commitment to internationalism. However, South Korea has long maintained a strong identity as a middle power.
This diplomatic activism is in part related to South Korea’s domestic politics, particularly the five-year, single-term presidential system. Under this restrictive system, South Korean presidents have difficulty time-wise in successfully carrying out their own domestic agendas. Foreign policy is an attractive alternative to boost their popularity and legitimacy. Such an incentive is even stronger for presidents from minority parties. This was the case with Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, and it is not coincidental that they were the two strongest advocates of an active foreign policy in South Korea’s history. South Koreans have also learned from history that South Korea should not be excluded from a table set to discuss critical regional issues. An active foreign policy holds a key to deal with this concern.
The actual performance of South Korea’s middle power activism, however, does not live up to the rhetoric or the actual effort. The most notable case was Roh Moo-hyun’s assertive diplomacy, to enhance South Korea’s autonomy from the US, to secure North Korea’s survival, and to institutionalize regional politics. The result was a total disaster, and ended up paying a high price for adventurism in return for nothing. This failure is largely attributable to the absence of support from the United States. South Korea under President Roh did not just passively avoid seeking US support but quite often actively challenged key US interests in the region. South Korea’s regional drive was in part geared toward diluting US influence on the Korean peninsula as well as in East Asia. East Asian community building and EAS (East Asian Summit) were enthusiastically sought after since they excluded the United States. In the process, the South Korean government has quite often showed more affinity with China, Malaysia or other developing countries than with the US or other advanced countries in the Asia Pacific region.
South Korea needs to learn from the middle power diplomacy of Canada and Australia. We may divide middle powers into three groups in terms of their relationship with the United States: allies, distant friends, and antagonists. Canada and Australia belong to the first group, in which middle powers pursued an active foreign policy largely with the support of the United States, thereby marking the most impressive score. Their middle power diplomacy had the effect of complementing US hegemony. Nordic countries like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden belong to the second group, in which the middle power kept its distance from the United States. They pursued middle power diplomacy independently of the United States, making some difference in PKO and human rights issues. Sometimes, they tried to reform the US-led international order. The third group includes developing regional powers like Brazil, India, and South Africa, etc. They have openly challenged US leadership but without success worth mentioning.
The scorecards for middle power diplomacy show that the first group performed best in making a meaningful dent in the world of great power politics. South Korea is very close to the first group with its intimate relationship with the United States, and has no reason to discard this valuable asset. Moreover, history shows that middle power diplomacy cannot succeed by antagonizing the hegemon, particularly in the realm of security. President Roh Moo-hyun’s diplomacy was no exception. Therefore, South Korea’s middle power activism has to be built upon solid cooperation with the United States.
On the part of the United States, South Korea’s role deserves more attention. At present, the region does not welcome the direct leadership of the United States. China is not trustworthy; Japan is unpopular in the region; and South Korea is underweight diplomatically. In the short run, the United States cannot do much about China’s credibility or Japan’s popularity problems, but can do a lot about South Korea’s diplomatic capacity.
The Case for US-ROK Cooperation
Institutionalized security cooperation in Northeast Asia can be South Korea’s diplomatic niche. This area is relatively disregarded by major regional powers like the United States, China, and Japan, who have been more concerned about global affairs and ad hoc handling of regional issues. As a result, East Asian economic cooperation has been led by ASEAN and South Korea, instead of regional powers like China or Japan. Similarly, Northeast Asia security cooperation may be led by secondary states, and South Korea is more than willing to lead an active diplomacy in Northeast Asia.
On the part of the US government, its lack of interest in regional initiatives led to the decline of its influence in East Asia. The US was not only disinterested in regional institutions but also tried on several occasions to discourage regional initiatives that excluded it. The US government thought bilateral security alliances would do for regional security. However, bilateral alliances are under strain for various reasons. In particular, China sees the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances increasingly with suspicion, as a scheme to contain its rise. There is a strong voice against US unilateralism in the region, too. The US needs to find a regional institutional structure to complement its bilateral alliance system. A rising China requires sustained and constructive engagement by the United States, and China feels more comfortable in a regional than a bilateral setting with the United States. A regional security structure will also be useful to decelerate China-Japan rivalry being intensely waged on a regional scale.
Washington does not have to assume all the responsibilities for maintaining regional stability or building a regional security structure. Cooperation with regional countries is essential, and Washington needs to understand the beauty of leadership from below. In this regard, the South Korea card deserves more attention. As mentioned above, South Korea has a long history of active regional policy. Despite its recent aberration, it has largely been a faithful alliance partner. Fortunately, a pro-US government is in power in South Korea, and Washington has to take advantage of this opportunity, thereby expanding the scope of bilateral cooperation and laying the foundation for a multilateral security structure for the region. South Korea’s activism will not draw as much opposition as China’s or Japan’s may from neighbors.
Tasks Ahead in US-ROK Cooperation
Washington and Seoul should and can work together to bring institutionalized security to the region. For this joint mission, both sides need to rebuild or restore mutual trust and share a common vision for the future of the region as well as for the bilateral alliance. Recently, both countries agreed to strengthen the bilateral security alliance to meet the challenges of 21st century, specifically, to transform it into a “more nimble and agile alliance” that can deal with various problems arising from a fluid and complex security environment in the region. The task ahead is to share a common vision for the region. So far, regional major powers like the US, Japan, and China have felt no strong need to come to a mutual understanding, and it would not have been easy even if they had tried. Regional major powers have instead worked hard to prevent each other from taking a leadership position or to prevent regional secondary powers from falling under each other’s influence. The outcome is a sluggish progress toward institutionalization.
The US needs to strengthen its cooperation with South Korea to come up with as well as to realize a common vision for the region. The United States also has to recognize South Korea’s genuine value in regional politics as a partner to complement its hegemonic leadership. This requires the US to keep a more balanced position between Japan and South Korea. KORUS FTA was a right move in that direction, and it must be ratified at the earliest possible moment. Judging from the strong interests expressed by Japan and China in FTAs with South Korea afterward, the KORUS FTA can not only trigger region-wide economic integration, but also become a starting point for South Korea’s genuine middle power regional diplomacy, built upon bilateral cooperation with the United States. Both countries can work together to let success in the economic realm spill over into the security realm.
For the success of this joint effort, South Korea needs to mature politically and diplomatically, thereby reestablishing itself as a trustworthy partner for the United States. South Koreans are still suffering from a victim mentality or an inferiority complex. As a result, they are overly sensitive to national sovereignty or pride. Anti-Americanism still commands a wide audience. Mob mentality is taking foreign policy hostage, which has to be a rational calculation of national interests. Policy makers and the general public quite often forget budget constraints or inevitable trade-offs between important values like security and autonomy. Most important of all, South Koreans must realize that its middle power activism can succeed only if the United States is behind it.
A diplomatic process is already underway to create a regional peace and security mechanism in the form of a working group within the six-party talks. Both the US and South Korea should cooperate closely on the basic frameworks and detailed design of such a mechanism. It may start from a mild form of cooperation, say cooperative security that may promote military transparency and joint handing of regional crises. It may gradually evolve into collective defense and ultimately a security community.
Depending upon its relationship with China, the US may seriously consider the option to expand NATO into the Asia-Pacific region in the name of constructing a “security community of democratic states.” Besides being a useful mechanism to contain an unruly China, it also can work well to solve regional security problems like terrorism, crime, and human security issues, as well as traditional security issues. It will have the effect of diffusing domestic opposition in Korea against too close an alignment with the United States, attenuating regional concern against US unilateralism, and relieving the security dilemma a normalizing Japan may cause to the region. In addition, this option will be less objectionable to China than a US-Japan-ROK trilateral alliance. Democratic China may one day join this regime. *
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